Managing Scientific Patenting in French Research
Organizations Gabriel Galvez-Behar "In protecting the results of research carried out in universities is a major issue because it lies at the heart of the definition of recoverable. Yet the policies to protect research are relatively new in the universities, either because the results were managed by other agencies, including within the framework of joint research units, or because the power relationship with the companies weighed against them." 2 How can we explain the role of these agencies in the development of scientific patenting in France? And how can we explain the reluctance of French universities to patent? Our main assumption is that the answers to these questions are part of a long-term process, which started during World War I and lasted until the late 1950s.
I will begin by listing specific features of the relationship between science and patenting in nineteenth-century France. Then I will analyze patenting in French public research during the interwar period. Finally, I will examine the structures of French patent management in public research in the wake of World War II.
French scientists and patenting in the nineteenth century
It is important to recall certain features of science and patenting in nineteenth-century France. 3 Some of the most famous French scientists knew that patents existed and did not hesitate to use them, including Gay-Lussac, Louis Pasteur and even Pierre Curie in the early days of his career. This was not only a way to promote industrial development, it also helped prevent industrialists from imposing a monopoly on their own scientific discoveries. In the mid-nineteenth century the distinction between industrial inventions, which could be protected by patents, and scientific discoveries, which could not, was far from definitive. During the parliamentary debates on the adoption of the 1844 Patent Act, François Arago suggested that some scientists and lawyers defended the idea of 'patents for principles'. Moreover, during the so-called 'patent controversy', scientists, industrialists and lawyers alike were perfectly aware that the outcome of extending the notion of intellectual property would be the emergence of 'scientific property'.
Although French science and the French patent system were not two hermetic worlds in the nineteenth century, it is difficult to know whether there was some kind of patent management within scientific institutions since 'research' did not mean the same thing as it does today. It was disseminated in institutions such as the Museum d'histoire naturelle, the Collège de France, the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, the École pratique des hautes études, the universities and in other scholarly societies. As far as we know, none of these institutions filed for patents before World War I. Corporate patenting existed in France, although it was not often practiced, but scientific institutions could not to apply for patents since they were generally public institutions. This was the case for universities. Under the Third Republic, the Napoleonic Université de France and its faculties gradually became regional universities. 4 In 1893, a law gave the conseil des facultés, which brought together all the faculties in the same city, a de jure existence. In 1896, the conseil des facultés adopted the term 'university'. The regulations adopted in 1897 to manage the budgets of universities and faculties make no mention of these types of institution taking out patents.
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Until the early twentieth century, it seems that only individual scientists could take out patents in France.
The experience of World War I
Although collaboration between scientists and industry certainly pre-dates World War I, it was on the eve of the Great War that it took on new forms and that a new organization of relations between science and industry emerged. In this context, industrial property was at stake.
The mobilization of scientists and the question of patents
World War I witnessed the scientific communities of all the warring parties making a substantial commitment to the war effort. There is a consolidated body of research on the nature of this mobilization of science in weapons research. France, 1863 -1914 , Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1983 C. Charle, La République des universitaires, 1870 -1940 , Paris, Seuil, 1994 exchange of scientific information among the Allies, and these exchanges were in turn formalized by meetings and inter-allied organizations.
It is worth noting the nature of scientific information exchanged within this epistemic community. Far from fitting the Mertonien ideal of scientific communalism, the exchanges among scientists were, in fact, very heavily constrained by military secrecy.
The traditional networks of scientific publication were, so to speak, placed in parenthesis when it came to discussing or sharing work relating to the war effort. At the same time,
there was another type of transmission of information and expertise through interpersonal meetings, correspondence and relations with the authorities. The proof of this lies, for instance, in the almost 400 reports sent by the U.S. scientific attaché in London, Dr.
Henry A. Bumstead, to the National Research Council in 1918-1919. 7 In other respects, the question of the extent of free exchange of information and cooperation among the Allies was decisive. In a note to the National Research Council, the U.S. scientific attaché was quick to stress the proven loyalty of his British counterparts, inviting his U.S.
colleagues to act in a similar fashion in sharing expertise.
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On the whole, shared scientific information was not necessarily made public and the extent and form of its dissemination was cause for debate among the actors themselves.
The information and expertise at the heart of this national and international network was primarily oriented towards its industrial application. This immediately raised the question of industrial property rights in a context where all the belligerents had adopted protective and exclusionary rules. The Direction des inventions was anxious to protect inventors against 'plagiarism' and advised them to take out patents. discovery which leads to a patent, the patent will be owned by the State; which funded the research. The National Centre will be in charge of the use of the patents.
The scientific property of the discovery will remain with the author." would be based.
[Insert 
The Centre national de la recherche scientifique at war
One of the first tasks of the CNRS was to manage Joliot's patents and on 12 March 1940, a legal committee was set up to examine the issue.
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There were plans to set up a company to implement the patents, but this was interrupted by Germany's invasion of
France. Yet, in a sense, during this short time, the foundations for the patent management office were laid at the CNRS. In 1939 Raymond Weiss had already been asked to help the CNRS in managing Joliot's patents. Colin, 2013. 29 AN, 19760356/75. 30 AN, 19760356/77. 31 AN, 19760356/74. the École normale supérieure. By 1923 he was a qualified teacher, a doctor in physics and also a law graduate. He taught at the Sorbonne and worked for a patent agent. Despite his place in this particular milieu, Volkringer did not manage to find a permanent job. Thus, early on in World War II, we find him assisting the secretary of the CSI, the mathematician and computer pioneer, Léon Couffignal, who was also a patentee. aeronautics.
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The CNRS made some of its facilities and staff available to the GRA and the contract focused on the question of patents and publishing: discoveries made in the framework of this partnership were owned by the GRA, whose authorization was required for publication. During the war, the GRA applied for about fifty patents in France and abroad.
World War II did not interrupt the process which had begun in the 1930s. On the contrary, scientific research institutions devoted to the promotion of invention were still financed, the interest for scientific patenting increased, and patent management was better structured thanks to the organization of public research.
New French research agencies and patenting: Joliot revisited
The Liberation in 1944 and the drive for reconstruction also meant a reorganization of public scientific research. In a way, this was not a breakdown of the existing system, but a continuation of a process initiated in the mid-1930s. Some institutions, which had been The CNRS continued to exist and Frédéric Joliot-Curie became its director in 1944. Joliot was also the first High Commissioner for atomic energy because of the creation of the CEA. The question of the patents was central to the development of the CEA and, more generally, for the improvement of a French nuclear industry. Actors interested in nuclear energy were perfectly aware that patents were necessary to allow scientific collaboration and international partnership. However, this is not the place to describe the problems related to patents in the early days of the CEA. We can, nevertheless, mention the position, which Joliot expressed in March 1946 during a meeting of the Scientific Committee of the CEA. He was convinced of the need to focus on patents and suggested not only working with patent agents but also recommended hiring an engineer to manage this kind of question within the CEA.
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Soon after his nomination, and despite the possible conflict of interest, Joliot -and his colleagues -wanted the CNRS to submit their patents to the CEA. The procedure was quite difficult because some patents were taken out by the inventors themselves and not by the CNRS. The objective was thus to secure the ownership of the CEA without taking risks with the validity of the original patents, which had been filed for abroad. It took three years (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) to complete this process. Joliot insisted on having a specific clause in the contract between the CNRS and the CEA: if the CNRS granted its patents free of charge, then 'pure' research had to be rewarded if these patents were successful and economically profitable. In a sense, Joliot put into practice the principle of 'scientific property', which had been demanded by scientists in the 1920s: science had to benefit from the profits it generated.
The 1951 reform
Thus patenting played an important role during the emergence of a new institutional framework for science in France, but patent management was still a delicate affair in these new organizations. In 1945, Volkringer tried to strengthen his own position by suggesting a new organization for the Department of Inventions and Patents. His intention was to coordinate applied research through a single institution for inventors to submit their inventions. In a sense, this was an attempt to keep the old system inherited from World War I. What Volkringer wanted was a new dimension for his Department: it would not only protect inventors but also CNRS agents' inventions; it would not only protect them, but also help them to implement their plans. This proposal did not meet with success, probably because its aim was not really to introduce something but to maintain the existing Department. In 1950, however, this project was revived and a year later a decree made the CNRS the main actor for scientific patenting. This decree stated This project was the opportunity to inquire about 'public patents' and the CNRS was one of the first governmental agencies to hold them.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Conclusion
The use of patents by scientists lies at the heart of dynamics emerging in the 1930s in the field of nuclear physics. Patent management in scientific organizations met several needs:
enforcing the rights of scientists involved with industrial partners, providing income for science, and allowing scientific exchanges at the international level. Patent management was also a way to practice science, as expressed very clearly by Frédéric Joliot in 1947:
"I have to say something with a little flashback. In 1939-1940, an important issue that was discussed and, I would say, that made it difficult to obtain a solution, is the fact that it was considered that spending a lot of money for patents, would be very expensive ... Indeed I believe that these patents have cost a total of about 3 to 4 million, it's obviously a heavy load for the CNRS these three million [for] patents ... We can afford this cost because we think it is worth much more, even if it does not bring in a penny ... or a franc ... I mean if it does not put a franc on the 1 others understood the importance of patents first-hand and how they could be used in the service of science and did not forget to take this into account when setting up the new organization dedicated to French science.
However the centralization of scientific patenting by the CNRS may have had a particular consequence: it may have prevented other actors, such as universities, from developing their own patent culture and patenting capacity. In the universities, scholars could choose between applying to the CNRS or filing for a patent themselves. This is probably why the first patent was only submitted by a French university in 1965. 45 
Patent management in
French research organizations probably depends on this path-dependency which has to be considered for public policy. 
